The American Task Force on Lebanon recently facilitated two consecutive delegation visits to Lebanon, which included bipartisan Congressional staffers as well as business and civic leaders from the Lebanese American community. The delegations met with leading officials of the Lebanese government, parliament, military, business community, and civil society. They came home with a better understanding of the opportunities and growing challenges facing Lebanon, following a destructive war, which has resulted in several thousand dead, many of whom are children, and more than 1.2 million displaced.

Lebanon has made significant progress over the past year toward becoming a sovereign, stable, prosperous country at peace with its neighbors. But that progress could stall without sustained US leadership and encouragement and compromise from Lebanon and Israel.

Background

The US mediated a ceasefire in Lebanon in November 2024, which led to the election of an independent and competent President, Prime Minister and technocratic government, more capable than any other in recent times. The government, under the strong leadership of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, has passed historic laws calling for the total disarmament of all non-state militias in the country, especially Hezbollah, and is slowly enacting key reforms to stabilize the country. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) initially succeeded in completing the first phase of its disarmament plan, and Lebanese President Aoun took the bold decision to call for direct dialogue with Israel in the name of peace, which resulted in direct negotiations between the two countries (the first time they have done so in more than forty years). 

These actions and decisions of the Lebanese people and its government come at a time when Syria has rid its country of Iranian influence and Hezbollah is at its weakest point at any time in its history. The US-Iranian war has further deteriorated the ability of Iran to support its proxies in Lebanon and the region. Importantly, for the first time in many decades, Lebanon is on the front burner of the White House’s agenda,with President Trump engaging directly and frequently with US, Israeli and Lebanese negotiators and hosting an important and historic oval office meeting with President Aoun.

Current Situation

The direct talks led to the negotiation of the Trilateral Framework, signed by Lebanon and Israel, and facilitated by the US. The Framework calls for the identification of specific zones agreed upon by the parties and will include four synchronized actions for each zone, including: Israeli withdrawal from the identified zone; the LAF entering and disarming all lethal strategic weapons and remaining embedded in order to secure each site; and, the US leading an effort to facilitate the selection of a verification mechanism, made up of countries willing to independently verify that the terms of withdrawal and disarmament are being met. Finally, the Framework allows for citizens from a given zone to move back to their homes and rebuild their lives, without interference, with the US leading an effort to encourage international support for reconstruction of areas destroyed by the war. 

The Challenges Ahead

Several challenges must be overcome to achieve Lebanon's goal of a sovereign, stable, and prosperous country.

Since its destructive decision to enter the US-Iran war on March 2, Hezbollah has continued to obstruct agreements between Israel and Lebanon and defy Lebanese government decrees, defying the LAF's disarmament mission. Continued Israeli strikes and destruction are also impeding the Framework and raising doubts about Israel's willingness to withdraw fully from Lebanese territory.

The LAF also needs US and international support to strengthen intelligence, mobility, drone capabilities, training, and support for troops and their families, in order to carry out this mission.

In light of upcoming elections, the Israeli government does not appear to be supportive of further withdrawals from future pilot zones. The two countries are now examining efforts to keep the momentum of the Framework negotiations going, with new efforts to make progress on prisoner exchanges and border demarcation. However, without a commitment to Israeli withdrawal and ceasefire, the pilot zones appear to have hit a barrier until at least after the elections.

The citizens of the south who have attempted to move back to their homes have been met with unsafe security corridors to their villages and continued Israeli bombing in areas very close to their homes. In the first pilot zone, it was reported that fifty families initially moved back to the Zawtar zone and quickly exited when Israeli bombing near the zone commenced. Israel claimed that the LAF had not completed its disarmament requirements in the zone.

The US has yet to announce a verification mechanism acceptable to both sides. Without an independent mechanism brokered by Washington, the pilot zones face an uncertain future as each side lodges complaints about the other’s failures to fulfil terms of the framework.

Lebanon also lacks sufficient governance structures and reforms to ensure humanitarian relief reaches displaced families without Hezbollah interference and to build stable institutions, including a transparent and internationally credible banking sector.

A persistent concern in Washington and Lebanon is whether the LAF has the will to militarily confront Hezbollah when necessary. Lebanese leaders argue that force alone cannot defeat Hezbollah and that confrontation without an alternative source of security and support for communities under its influence is likely to fail. As one US military expert remarked, "If Israel can't defeat Hamas or Hezbollah, how do they expect the LAF to defeat Hezbollah?"

This viewpoint is gaining momentum in the US and Lebanon with calls for a more comprehensive approach combining LAF training and capabilities with banking reform, investment, reconstruction, and support for displaced families. Lebanese officials maintain that military force should remain the last resort for disarming Hezbollah.

Still, the perception that Lebanon and the LAF may lack the will to confront Hezbollah if necessary remains a serious concern in Washington and Lebanon.

Proposed Recommendations for Lebanon

While there is a growing consensus that success will come only with a more comprehensive approach, balancing military and political efforts, there is also a growing view that the Lebanese government is not willing to take the final military step, if necessary, to disarm Hezbollah. This viewpoint is gaining ground in Washington policy circles as well as causing a split between the Lebanese government and some Lebanese political parties, which can lead to growing tension within Lebanon. This perception can affect US military aid for Lebanon.

Lebanon should counter perceptions of inaction by unilaterally delivering concrete political and military reforms that demonstrate to Washington that it is fulfilling its commitments, even as Framework issues continue to be negotiated trilaterally.

Military actions should include:

  • Complete the government's decree establishing a monopoly on arms in Beirut.
  • Identify and arrest IRGC officers.
  • Secure a monopoly of arms in Mt. Lebanon and North Lebanon, areas where the LAF has overwhelming support and where there is only limited Hezbollah presence.
  • Complete one pilot zone by clearing and holding it and providing the civil and security support needed for residents to return without Hezbollah interference.
  • Present an LAF plan for establishing a monopoly on arms in the south and across the country, with timelines and specific equipment, troop, training, and intelligence needs. The LAF should articulate and communicate its own plan rather than wait for the Framework to define one.

Political actions should include:

  • Enact a gap law to restructure and restore the banking sector.
  • Speed up laws and actions to close down any illicit financial exchanges
  • Replace key positions currently influenced by Hezbollah in the deep state, with qualified determine leaders capable and willing to carry out the government’s orders
  • Authorize the LAF to enter homes when there is reasonable suspicion of illegal weapons.
  • Repeal the law that makes it illegal for Lebanese citizens to interact with Israelis
  • Conduct an active dialogue between the government – President, PM and Speaker - and political parties to seek a consensus view on moving forward, in order to better speak with one voice in international fora.
  • Develop and communicate a national vision with clear deliverables and timelines.

The LAF has repeatedly demonstrated its fighting capability and earned the respect of the US military. The LAF and Lebanese government however must do more to show they have the will to establish a state monopoly on arms while advancing reforms and presenting one common vision internationally in support of a sovereign, stable, and prosperous Lebanon.

Conclusion: Advice for the United States

Lebanon's recent progress would not have been possible without US leadership in bridging differences between Lebanon and Israel and encouraging Lebanon on its reform agenda. Without sustained US engagement, that progress could stall or give way to renewed instability.

The US will need to establish immediately an independent verification process that ensures that both Lebanon and Israel are fulfilling their respective obligations outlined in the Framework, and where necessary, support and fund LAF capability to complete its tasks. The US must make it clear to Israel that it must adhere to the terms of its ceasefire and withdrawal agreements with Lebanon. And, the US must make it clear to Lebanon that doing nothing militarily until other government plans come into operation, is not acceptable.